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Abstract 
It seems that when disasters, either natural or man-made occur, governments often turn to the 
military for help as the military have certain resources immediately to hand, such as food, 
medicine and fuel as well as logistical resources of transport, communications and human 
assets with which to distribute them. Recent events in Haiti, Pakistan and more recently 
Australia showing relief agencies distributing food and medicines under the protection of 
military forces, or aid workers and military working together to construct refugee camps, set 
up field hospitals, provide emergency water and sanitation, has heightened the expectation of 
a smooth interaction. 
Due to fundamental differences between international military forces, humanitarian and 
development agencies in terms of the principles and doctrines guiding their work, their 
agendas, operating styles and roles, the area of civil military logistical coordination in 
humanitarian relief has proven to be more difficult than other interagency relationships. This 
paper outlines the current challenges as they relate to the logistic aspects of 
disaster/emergency preparation and response, and to discuss the areas in which the 
development of closer civil-military cooperation could be of particular benefit. To achieve 
this, the first section will reflect on examples as illustrations of the challenges inherent in the 
achievement of successful civil-military cooperation. The subsequent sections will discuss 
the logistical challenges facing civil military cooperation in humanitarian relief operations. 
The paper will conclude with proposals to improve civil military logistical cooperation within 
humanitarian relief. 
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Improving the civil military dimension in humanitarian logistics: The challenges 
 
Introduction 
It seems that when disasters, either natural or man-made occur, governments often turn to the 
military for help as the military have certain resources immediately to hand, such as food, 
medicine and fuel as well as logistical resources of transport, communications and human 
assets with which to distribute them (Weiss and Campbell, 1991). Recent events in Haiti, 
Pakistan and more recently Australia showing relief agencies distributing food and medicines 
under the protection of military forces, or aid workers and military working together to 
construct refugee camps, set up field hospitals, provide emergency water and sanitation, has 
heightened the expectation of a smooth interaction. 
 
Due to fundamental differences between international military forces, humanitarian and 
development agencies in terms of the principles and doctrines guiding their work, their 
agendas, operating styles and roles, the area of civil military logistical coordination in 
humanitarian relief has proven to be more difficult than other interagency relationships.  
 
This paper outlines the current challenges as they relate to the logistic aspects of 
disaster/emergency preparation and response, and to discuss the areas in which the 
development of closer civil-military cooperation could be of particular benefit. To achieve 
this, the first section will reflect on examples as illustrations of successful civil-military 
cooperation engagement. The subsequent sections will discuss the logistical challenges facing 
civil military cooperation in humanitarian relief operations. The paper will conclude with 
proposals to improve civil military logistical cooperation within humanitarian relief. 
3 
 
Successful civil military logistic engagement 
The donation and delivery of hospital supplies during a storm in Haiti, the reconstruction of 
the power grid in Najaf, the distribution of blankets to orphans in Afghanistan, and the 
construction of a new maternity ward at a Basra hospital all represent humanitarian and 
reconstruction work that is conducted by the international community (Richards, 2005; 
Devenney, 2004 and O’Neill, 2004). Projects such as these are easily associated with the 
work of United Nations agencies, government development agencies like USAID, and NGOs 
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), CARE, Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF), and Oxfam. However, these projects, and hundreds of others like them, 
were, and continue to be, delivered by American, Australian, British, Canadian, Dutch and 
many other militaries involved in humanitarian operations.  
 
Barber (2011) describes some of the military logistics contribution to the Haitian earthquake 
disaster in 2010. The helicopter carrier USS Bataan and three large dock landing ships as well 
as two US survey/salvage vessels created a sea base for the rescue efforts. The French Navy 
provided the Navy ship, the Francis Garnier, and an amphibious transporter, the Siroco. The 
US hospital ship, USNS Comfort, was extensively used for emergency operations of over 600 
casualties of the earthquake.  The US Navy contribution to the Haiti disaster was 17 ships, 48 
helicopters and 12 fixed-wing aircraft together with 10,000 sailors and Marines. The US 
Navy delivered 32,400 gallons of water and 532,440 bottles of water, over 100,000 meals and 
massive medical supplies after five days. A similar armada provided a floating hospital and 
recreation base around East Timor during 1999-2000.  
 
There is relatively little philosophical objection to the engagement on military personnel, 
equipment in the aftermath of a natural or technological disaster (Wiharta, et al, 2008).  Thus, 
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in recent years the SE Asia tsunami (2004), Pakistan earthquake (2005), Haiti earthquake 
(2010) and Pakistan flooding (2010) have all seen significant involvement of military 
personnel from countries other than those directly affected. The challenge of achieving civil-
military engagement in the context of a complex emergency is unquestionably more difficult 
than in the disaster response space.  In this scenario, NGOs need to balance their view of the 
inherent requirements of adherence to a policy of Humanity, Impartiality and Neutrality with 
the reality that a country’s armed forces are a reflection of the government of that country 
and, hence, its view of the rights and wrongs of the complex emergency in question.  
However, even though military forces have a huge potential to make a difference in the 
logistic arena through their relatively ready availability of funding, trained manpower and 
appropriate equipment, sensitivities remain (Thompson, 2010).   
 
Logistical challenges for civil military cooperation in humanitarian relief operations  
There has been a shift in military logistical roles over the last decade to incorporate their 
involvement in humanitarian logistics. Military involvement in humanitarian supply chains 
falls under the term, Military Involvement in Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The 
parallels are striking between the military logistics and the humanitarian logistics. Weiss and 
Campbell (1991) discuss the historical context of military involvement in humanitarian aid. 
They suggest military responsibility should be used for rapid deployment of supplies and 
provisions but also questions the appropriateness of military involvement. Increasingly the 
military has become a key member of immediate disaster relief (Barber, 2011). It has 
expanded from rapid deployed transportation and logistical requirements and assets and is 
now involved with the more complex tasks of refugee protection, repatriation and 
peacekeeping. Military is also often involved in medical advancements, rehabilitations and 
reconstruction of facilities. 
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Delivering substance to the living in the immediate relief response stage is only the beginning 
of the situation. The safety, protection and health of the living; the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of the aftermath and sustaining the security, continuity of the reconstruction 
and development of the region means that there are a number of different logistical 
challenges involved in humanitarian logistics.  
 
Each of the following subsections presents issues that negatively impact civil military 
cooperation in logistics operations during humanitarian relief missions. Those in 
management/command appointments have to consider not only the effect the challenges 
listed below have on their agency, partners and beneficiaries, but as leaders they are 
challenged to direct and control logistical operations within their remit.  
 
Coordination 
Despite its many advantages, military coordination with potential partners in a humanitarian 
crisis is often difficult (Heaslip, 2011). Particularly at the operational level, coordination 
among NGOs, International Organisations (IOs), donor governments, and military forces 
lacks control. This problem is compounded by the fact that many organisations do not have 
established and well-defined working relationships with one another (Olson and Gregorian, 
2007).  
 
To stage its response, the military and humanitarian organisations need to coordinate their 
activities with other humanitarian organisations and key stakeholders with a view to manage 
fit, flow and sharing resource dependencies (Kovacs and Tatham, 2009). As time is crucial 
during an emergency response, the military and humanitarian community need to avoid 
parallel efforts and duplications along the supply chain by combining their efforts and 
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activities with other stakeholders. Joint contingency planning helps reduce lead times and 
avoid reliance on expensive transport options (e.g. airlifting) or last-minute sourcing (Heaslip 
et al, 2007a; Balcik et al, 2010). This planning further helps in the development of alternative 
plans and ensures the mobilisation of the right range of relief items. During joint contingency 
planning sessions, implementation strategies such as prepositioning - strategic placement of 
food or Non Food Items (NFIs) throughout a country/area accessible for distribution to 
recipients - act as key coordination mechanisms.  
 
Relief items differ in terms of their urgency (water), life saving contribution (medicine), 
volumes required (food), complementary (kitchen kits) or simple (clothing) function, 
continuous (food) or one-of-a-time (vaccines) usage, degree of substitutability, and need for 
specialised input (medical personnel for medicines and medical care). The different value and 
characteristics of relief items together with the mismatch between available transport and 
handling capacity and the volume of cargo moving into a region call for the prioritisation of 
relief item movements into the disaster theatre (Heaslip, 2011). Prioritisation – movement of 
food, NFIs and people in accordance with humanitarian priorities – helps overcome a sharing 
dependency. By participating in joint contingency planning (e.g., Kosovo, Haiti) the military 
and humanitarian organisations are able to identify potential problems associated with the 
movement of food and NFIs and the potential security threat to the movement of people 
(refugees, returnees, humanitarian and media operators) as well as providing the 
transportation and human resources to solve the problems.  
 
Control  
Within the UN, CIMIC falls under the remit of OCHA as a section called Civil Military 
Coordination Section (CMCS). For the military, Civil Military Operations Centres (CMOC) 
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are usually established within the humanitarian space by the joint force commander (Barber, 
2011).  The CMOC assists the commander in coordination of military activities, host 
government agencies, NGOs and regional organisations. The structure varies to match the 
size and composition requirements of any given situation. The CMOCs are formed during 
complex humanitarian emergencies such as the Kurdistan situation in Iraq post Desert Storm 
and the genocide atrocities in Somalia and Rwanda. They were a response to situations where 
no host national government existed to manage the humanitarian relief activities (Barber, 
2011).  It is argued that these centres are not suitable where there are host governments with 
their own military forces to coordinate in conjunction with the UN agencies such as the UN-
CMCoord (UN, 2007).  
 
Needs assessment  
From the perspective of the logistician, achieving a timely assessment of the needs of the 
affected population is key to building an efficient and effective supply network (Tatham, 
2011).  Inevitably, in the first instance much of the logistic response will be on a ‘push’ basis 
that reflects the experience of the organisation concerned and, where possible, is informed by 
their local staff (van Wassenhove et al., 2010).  However, such educated guesses will almost 
certainly be, at least in part, wrong.  As a result, either too much materiel will be provided – 
which is clearly inefficient; or too little and/or the wrong materiel will be supplied leading to 
unnecessary loss of life or prolonged suffering. However, it is argued that there is significant 
merit in incorporating suitable military logisticians in the needs assessment process, not least 
because they will thereby be better placed to understand what support they might sensibly 
offer. 
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Immediately after a humanitarian emergency is declared humanitarian organisations 
regardless of their size or area of specialisation (refugees, children, food) face a number of 
logistical challenges. The first challenge facing a humanitarian organisation immediately 
after a humanitarian emergency is declared is how to bridge the relief resource and capability 
gap, in other words uncertainty, which is often significant. To stage a response and overcome 
this gap, military and humanitarian organisations depend on their supply network composed 
of a number of loose partnerships with a range of actors (Kovacs and Spens, 2007). Once in 
the operating theatre, humanitarian supply chains tend to compete over the same range of 
resources at exactly the same arch of time. 
 
In humanitarian crises uncertainty can stem from many elements, such as the organisation 
itself, or the nature of demand. For example, uncertainty may arise from inherent 
characteristics such as what and how much material is demanded, product traits, process 
fluctuations, and supply problems (Van der Vorst and Beulens, 2002). Van der Vorst and 
Beulens also recognise how decision complexity, supply chain configuration and control 
structures, long forecast horizons, poor information reliability, and agency culture may create 
uncertainty (2002).  
 
One of the most significant organisational capability resources of the humanitarian model is 
the local presence of a humanitarian organisation. Not only does this determine the focus of 
the organisation on particular activities (e.g. a focus on region-specific disasters), but also, 
impacts on the potential minimum speed of the organisation to respond to a particular disaster 
(Kovacs and Tatham, 2009). Humanitarian organisations with a local presence or “chapter” 
have access to local knowledge about beneficiaries and their needs and customs, something 
the military lack, and the humanitarian organisations are not dependent on the declaration of 
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a state of emergency before they can deliver aid to beneficiaries, unlike the military. On the 
opposite end of the humanitarian spectrum, international aid agencies and even the United 
Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC), which has a mandate to provide logistics 
information services during the immediate response to large-scale disruptions, can only start 
operating in a disaster-struck region upon the fulfilment of certain political criteria such as a 
declaration of emergency. 
 
This problem (of uncertainty) is amplified by distance. Long and Wood (1995) observed that 
often the office coordinating the aid mission is far away from the actual disaster site and must 
make assumptions about the types and quantities of aid that should be supplied. The same is 
true for the military where national headquarters make assumptions as to the requirements for 
troops being deployed. Once response teams and advance military parties are in place at the 
disaster site, the supply pipeline can transition from a “push” system to a “pull” system based 
on more accurate needs assessments and communications back to headquarters and donors 
(Long and Wood, 1995). These assessments should also include anticipated needs (PAHO, 
2000). If supplies are “pushed” through a system, quantities are dictated by an upstream 
authority with little or no input from the customer. In a “pull” system, quantities are 
determined at the point of consumption (Rodman, 2004).  
 
Infrastructure degradation   
Even before a crisis situation has arisen, the quality of the infrastructure of a potential host 
country, its topography and its political situation are all factors that often conspire against 
efficient logistical operations. Inadequate transportation, housing, shelter and 
communications (see section below for further analysis) are further barriers to effective 
delivery of aid.  
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Rapid onset of a disaster may degrade the country’s existing infrastructure to the point where 
delivery of aid is severely hampered, as in Haiti. As noted by Gooley (1999, p. 82), 
“Often…transportation infrastructure is in poor condition and cannot handle the huge 
numbers of refugees, military vehicles, and relief shipments that pour into these areas in 
times of disaster”. System-wide, the military commanders and humanitarian managers could 
encounter delivery options ranging through ships, aircraft, rail, and trucks. At the same time, 
those routes may be closed or clogged (Moody, 2001) limiting distribution. 
 
Previously, the shelter sector was understood mainly in terms of distributing tents or plastic 
sheeting: temporary shelter before the reconstruction of permanent housing. In Haiti many of 
the public buildings, residential housing and utilities were destroyed by the earthquake. There 
was severe damage to hospitals, schools and the Port-au-Prince’s two seaports. This 
infrastructure damage resulted in large scale displacement of people from their homes, into 
makeshift and overcrowded shelters. In some areas, up to 50% of buildings were completely 
destroyed and most others damaged, but repairable. Shelter for the hundreds of thousands of 
survivors remained a desperate race against the clock as the rainy and hurricane seasons 
loomed (Heaslip, 2011). 
 
In humanitarian crises not alone does the destruction affect private houses and social 
institutions: schools, hospitals, health centres, but in some cases (e.g., Afghanistan) water 
systems are heavily damaged and, as a consequence villages are without a water supply. Here 
the military and aid agencies (e.g., Oxfam) have an opportunity to collaborate to alleviate the 
suffering of the population. The obstacles mentioned above must be dealt with on a case-by-
case basis due to the unpredictable effects of disasters and the vulnerability of the 
infrastructure.  
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Communications  
A major barrier to delivery of aid is poor communication. Not only are there obvious 
difficulties associated with speaking to someone using a different language, but as in Haiti 
the communications infrastructure may be crippled. Relief agencies may not be able to 
communicate upstream with headquarters or donors during a disaster. Military forces 
however, can supply specialised capabilities such as communications equipment and 
information technology and information sharing capabilities (Moore and Antill, 2002). 
Moreover the military possess the capability to establish a communication network from a 
green field site.  With the priority being the completion of completing an accurate assessment 
in the immediate aftermath of a humanitarian crisis a fully functional communications and 
information systems network, plays an important role in delivering the right information 
regarding the right amount of aid to be delivered to the right people (Kovacs and Spens, 
2007). In the humanitarian community United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) is tasked with the role of coordinating the assessments, the dissemination of 
information regarding the affected areas and the appeals process, however sometimes it is not 
in a position to provide the communications infrastructure to deliver the necessary 
information (e.g., Haiti) and in these situations the military has a key role in filling the 
communications gap. 
 
Technologies are indispensable tools for many essential mission tasks. Modern technologies 
can extend the range of observation and communication, improve the safety of personnel, and 
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the mission (Wheatley and Welch, 1999; Pettit 
and Beresford, 2005). Military organisations can have specialised divisions and units (e.g., 
the army, navy, logistics, and communications) which need to be interoperable, but they still 
belong to the same defence force. Humanitarian actors, on the other hand, can be quite 
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specialised even within the UN family (with World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food, 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) shelter, World Health 
Organisation (WHO) medication). For civil-military cooperation, technologies of both 
organisations should be compatible. As noted by Rietjens (2006) the use of incompatible 
communications equipment (field phones, satellite phones, short wave radios) was a 
widespread problem in the former Yugoslavia. Some UN military contingents possessed 
more technically advanced equipment than that of NGOs or even other military contingents, 
making communications in the field difficult and often impossible (Beauregard, 1998; 
Kovacs and Tatham, 2009).  
 
Use of assets 
A key difference between UN and non-UN missions is, however, the confusion that arises as 
to what constitutes a military asset in a UN peace support operation. On the one end of the 
spectrum you have equipment that are owned by a troop contributing country (TCC) and 
deployed into a UN mission. On the other end of the spectrum you have equipment owned by 
the UN. One problem is that in most cases there is no visual distinction between the two 
because they are all painted white with UN markings in black. Equipment that is obviously 
military, such as an APC (Armoured Personnel Carrier) or an attack helicopter is probably 
less of a problem. In Liberia, United Nations Military in Liberia (UNMIL) transport trucks 
and general purpose helicopters, and engineering equipment were more difficult to identify as 
military or civilian. In some situations you may have a UN owned (civilian) asset, such as a 
commercially chartered transport helicopter, that is being used for military tactical purposes, 
such as placing or extracting soldiers into an operational, or even combat, situations, as in 
eastern DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo) where the UN mission (MONUC) is engaged 
in collaborative offensive operations (De Coning, 2007).  It is thus not necessarily obvious in 
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UN peace operation context, from the perspective of a humanitarian actor, or the local 
civilian community, or even the soldiers in question, whether a specific UN asset is a civilian 
or military asset, and that makes the application of the UN humanitarian civil military 
coordination guidelines, that are designed around this distinction, problematic to apply. 
 
Financial resources 
Unfortunately for many disaster-struck areas, such as Haiti and Pakistan, funding is often 
focused on short-term disaster relief (the immediate response phase). However, there is 
recognition that disaster preparedness enhances disaster response efficiency and effectiveness 
(Kovacs and Spens, 2007). Donors prefer to fund emergency activities and are often reluctant 
to cover core costs necessary to strengthen organisational capacity and capability. On the 
other hand, military organisations receive funding in order to be prepared for a disruption (i.e. 
the development of a capability), whilst in humanitarian organisations such funding is only 
received in response to a disruption (Kovacs and Tatham, 2009). Funding for organisational 
support and infrastructure is often neglected under donor demands that as much aid as 
possible is visibly pushed to victims. Thus, distribution channels may suffer as warehouses, 
equipment, communications infrastructure, and training remain unimproved or deteriorating. 
As a result, there may be aid available, but the humanitarian organisation may be incapable of 
effective delivery in a timely manner due to limiting factors in the distribution process.   
 
Investing in disaster preparedness allows the military to focus on physical and manpower 
resources, i.e. training, but this is inherently lacking for humanitarian organisations (Kovacs 
and Tatham, 2009). Humanitarian organisations may, for example, be reluctant to spend 
money on a sophisticated information system that would actually improve their efficiency in 
the long run. Earmarking funds specifically for the affected population can also lead to a lack 
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of parts and service support for the truck and planes required to move material aid and lack of 
funding for un-allocatable costs such as headquarters expenses (Pettit and Beresford, 2005).  
 
Performance management 
The “lack of universally accepted performance indicators” (Macrae, 2002, p. 5) makes 
gauging mission success and learning lessons from the operation difficult. The Sphere Project 
handbook, though accepted as a reference for performance measures in the humanitarian 
sector, lacks thorough detail, particularly on cooperation and coordination. The book 
advocates the integration of “many different players” (Sphere Project, 2004) in humanitarian 
relief but doesn’t state specific measures for evaluating performance of cooperation. Even in 
the United Nations humanitarian system, “evaluation and lessons learning is something that 
the IASC [Inter-Agency Standing Committee] has yet to tackle in a serious way” (Jones and 
Stoddard, 2003, p. 17). Without performance standards, employees have no means to gauge 
their success and no reference for making their operations better.  
 
Sowinski states that a lack of funds at the end of a humanitarian action often limits recording 
of best practices and tracking of information on complex supply chain conditions. It thereby 
hampers learning opportunities and institutional memory regarding successes and failures 
(Sowinski, 2003). As the money runs low and the relief mission and its workers fade into the 
background, it is understandable that events could slip by unrecorded and knowledge lost. 
The military for their part record all aspects of their mission and debrief national headquarters 
on their return (Petit and Beresford, 2005) with a view to improving performance for the next 
operation. 
 
 
15 
 
Human resources 
In addition to financial resource mobilisation and management, another critical element of an 
effective humanitarian response is the mobilisation and deployment of material and human 
resources (Forman and Parhad, 1997). Poor or nonexistent training ultimately affects the 
quality of any operation, particularly a relief operation. The unpredictable nature of 
emergencies makes it difficult to retain well trained employees, and those who have been 
trained are often volunteers who can only work for short periods before they must return to 
their “real world” jobs. Humanitarian organisations may experience as high as 80% annual 
turnover in field logistics personnel (Thomas, 2003), further compounding personnel issues. 
This results in a constant influx of untrained personnel, inexperienced in the particulars of 
logistics within the organisation and relief as a whole.  
 
The military has several virtually unique resources. They can both protect and defend 
themselves and break down the resistance of others with violence, they have rapid access to 
strategic and tactical transport resources, they can be self-sufficient for a longer period, and 
they have specialised aircraft capacities, maritime resources, reconnaissance, intelligence 
capacities, and an effective communications network (Eriksson, 2000). The military logistic 
network and machinery are extensive and speedy (claiming delivery in about five days from 
project approval, compared to five months for the EU and UN) (Pugh, 2001).  
 
Thomas points out that there may be problems with employee reliability (2003) stemming 
from lack of training. There is a notable lack of employees who are knowledgeable in supply 
chain or logistics management compared to the military. In the logistics area, the challenges 
facing humanitarian organisations are the formal qualification of logistics staff (Oloruntoba 
& Gray, 2006), optimisation of their logistics activities and the integration of activities across 
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business functions. Recently however, the setting of standards and framework agreements, to 
the training and education of staff has improved (Kovacs and Tatham, 2009). 
 
Personality 
Olson and Gregorian (2007) suggest that success in cross-sectoral collaboration, particularly 
in the realm of civil-military relations, often depends on the personalities of the field level 
personnel and the liaison structures that are established. Given the high rates of staff turnover 
in the field, particularly amongst the relief and development community, reliance on 
individuals becomes a risky business. Uncooperative attitudes are not uncommon within and 
across organisations. This may result from competition for resources, for power, and for 
notoriety, but it may also arise from personal likes and dislikes or stereotyping (Heaslip et al, 
2007b). 
 
Coordination between military forces and humanitarian organisations is found to be driven 
primarily by personalities rather than well-developed standard operating procedures 
(Brocades-Zaalberg, 2005). Since efforts are person-dependent, they vary within and between 
different military contingents. Beauregard (1998) in his study of civil-military activities 
during a number of disasters identifies six principal factors that hamper coordination and 
cooperation. These include differences in cultures and ideologies, differences in 
organisational structures and chain of command, communication breakdowns due to 
incompatible equipment or absence of communication procedures, refusal by humanitarian 
organisations of military assistance to protect independence and impartiality, and the threat or 
use of force by the military. He concludes by suggesting a range of solutions (training, better 
communication and consultation processes through events that improve mutual 
understanding, liaison teams) to improve the civil-military relationship. 
17 
 
Boundaries 
Despite their differences NGOs have joined together to agree on common principles and 
codes of practice for conduct of humanitarian operations where military forces are involved. 
In 2003, OCHA published a position paper (commonly referred to as the Oslo Guidelines), 
with the agreement of all UN agencies, NGO alliance and NATO, setting out the core 
humanitarian principles; humanity, impartiality and neutrality (UN, 2007).  
 
Some humanitarian agencies argue that coordination is, by definition, a threat to humanitarian 
action because it undermines impartiality and represents a fundamental threat to the 
operational flexibility and physical safety of aid workers (Olson and Gregorian, 2007). The 
counter argument posits that humanitarian space can be better protected through integrated 
structures as opposed to a fragmented approach and that the humanitarian perspective will 
have a more effective voice when at the same table with other elements of an integrated 
mission. Recently in Chad the UN mission ensured clear delineation as the military focused 
its efforts on establishing security and resisted the temptation to promote its mission in 
humanitarian or development terms. This facilitated the establishment of ‘clear blue water’ 
between the military and humanitarian community otherwise boundaries become blurred, 
which could result in lives becoming endangered, particularly the beneficiaries and aid 
workers (Heaslip, 2011).  
 
Culture 
It is easy to conceptualise civil military coordination as an effort by humanitarian and 
military organisations to synchronize their operations, and yet it has been described as a 
“contested concept with many different, competing definitions and doctrines that describe 
essentially the same activity…” (De Coning, 2007, p. 6). Military culture and civilian 
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cultures do not generally mesh seamlessly in relief settings. There are inherent stressors 
between them owing to differences in mandates, objectives, methods of operation and 
vocabulary. When the cultural differences confront each other on the ground, the inability to 
communicate effectively, caused by a lack of mutual understanding, creates tension. The 
tension manifests itself in five distinct areas – expectations, perceptions, resources, missions 
and values (Slim, 2006).  
 
As personnel from humanitarian organisations interact more regularly with military 
personnel, culture clashes become apparent. Aid workers often distrust the military, and the 
military similarly are suspicious of aid workers. Such unfamiliarity between organisations 
inevitably encourages the dissemination of ill-informed stereotypes. The military is 
frequently characterised as an insensitive, ill-informed, controlling, and inflexible war–
machine, while personnel of some humanitarian organisations are seen as sandal-wearing, 
undisciplined, and uncoordinated liberals (Duffey, 2000).  Operationally, aid agencies tend to 
be flexible whereas the military functions in a top-down manner, the durations of stay of aid 
agencies can be for many years, the military, on the other hand, prefers well defined end 
states and exit strategies, aid agencies have a culture of independence while the military is 
hierarchical, and soldiers are armed when dealing with local actors while aid and 
development workers are not (Ferks and Klem, 2006). Recently researchers and practitioners, 
in addition to aid organisations, militaries and governments, have instigated different forms 
of cooperation (Kovács & Spens 2007), the Humanitarian and Emergency Logistics 
Programme (HELP) in the UK, and Humanitarian Logistics (HUMLOG) in Scandinavia are 
some of the forums encouraging dialogue.  
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With continuous and multiple points of interface, military personnel and humanitarians 
interpret the world through the lens of their own culture. Lack of familiarity with the 
differences embedded in the organisation cultures is a breeding ground for misunderstanding 
and poor coordination and cooperation (Siegel, 2003). In many circumstances the use of a 
different language and terminology further obscures understanding, compounded by different 
interpretations of the same terms of reference (Heaslip et al, 2008).  
 
Solutions and Recommendations 
During humanitarian relief operations, strongly motivated people in both camps (i.e. civil and 
military) usually find ways to surmount barriers that they encounter, but valuable time is lost 
inventing and reinventing these solutions. At a philosophical level, it is noted that NGOs are 
uncomfortable with the military, but in the field there is often effective cooperation. As 
personnel security in relief operations becomes a growing concern for the relief community it 
follows that interaction with the military is set to grow. Enhanced civil military logistical 
cooperation requires a greater effort of all actors involved in humanitarian relief. The points 
discussed here are not in any way intended as the ultimate solution, but rather as a starting 
point for further discussions.  
 
Models 
One avenue that can be pursued is to adopt models for cooperation between the military and 
the civilian actors (Currey, 2003; Gourlay, 2000, and Rietjens, 2006). These models can 
synthesise what has been accomplished in previous operations and can foster a theatre 
specific modus vivendi between military formations and the variety of civilian actors. For 
those involved in humanitarian relief, models can contribute to the development of checklists, 
an increased understanding of (potential) conflicts in the process of cooperation, and 
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elements for procedures to increase the performance of the cooperation (Rietjens, 2006). 
Models can provide guidance about how partners may foster and manage relationships that 
will achieve favourable outcomes (Tuten and Urban, 2001). By conducting further research in 
this area it offers researchers a framework for future empirical studies to confirm or refute the 
legitimacy of the model.   
 
Planning  
The military have a very clear idea of what is meant by levels of strategic, operational and 
tactical planning, this is not necessarily true of the aid community. There are a number of 
reasons for this, the use of relatively flat organisational structures in the aid community do 
not promote hierarchical management as in the military. Reitjens et al (2007) argue 
conflicting objectives between military and humanitarian organizations often leads to 
resource wastage as relief agencies and military units undertake similar operations. This 
duplication is not only prevalent between military and NGOs but also between different 
NGOs. To ensure optimal resource usage they argue that the military involvements should 
adopt a subordinate role to the humanitarian lead agency. Nevertheless they acknowledge that 
the humanitarian agency needs to be present to provide appropriate guidance and this is often 
not possible as the military forces are the units first to reach the disaster area with air support 
and relief provisioning (Reitjens et al, 2007). 
 
Collaboration can take place at different stages along the relief chain (Oloruntoba and Gray, 
2006), e.g. during contingency planning, need assessment, appeals, transportation 
management, or last-mile distribution. While collaboration during an actual disaster (Thomas 
and Kopczak, 2007), especially at field level, seems to be more common, and has been 
enhanced through the setup of the UN Joint Logistics Centre (Heaslip, 2008; 2011), there is a 
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specific need for better, continuing collaboration after an operation, in preparation for the 
next one (Thomas and Kopczak, 2007). Particularly, only limited cooperation is reported or 
documented during the preparation phase of the disaster relief lifecycle. The continual change 
and inevitability of military involvement in humanitarian aid is due to the increase in natural 
disasters and complex emergencies (EM-DAT, 2010). NGOs are training more frequently 
with military forces and becoming acclimatised to military involvement in humanitarian aid 
(Tatham and Kovacs, 2010).  
 
Communications 
To overcome this humanitarian organisations and military organisations should settle on a 
common language regarding relief missions (Barry and Jeffrys, 2002). In many cases, the use 
of different ‘language’ and terminology seem to obscure any understanding of common 
objectives between the actors. Indeed it is questionable whether the various actors even have 
common objectives; perhaps it is more correct to say that each organisation will have its own 
objectives, but that they should all work towards a common purpose or vision. 
 
There needs to be mechanisms for collecting information (e.g. inventory requirements) but 
equally importantly, for producing useful knowledge from that information. There must be an 
expedient means of conveying knowledge to those who need it. To assist in the distribution of 
information, transparency needs to permeate across all organisations military and 
humanitarian which will provide answers rather than obscuring questions due to institutional 
resistance. Furthermore, as language and communication has proven to be a barrier it may 
prove beneficial to use neutral language when describing coordination meetings. This gesture 
would avoid misperceptions and mistrust.  
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Finance  
Funding structures can impede the humanitarian community in delivering aid in a timely and 
efficient manner. The military often have access to substantial discretionary funds, whilst the 
humanitarian relief community must go through much longer processes to secure funding. 
Mechanisms need to be developed to facilitate the swift transfer of funds from donors to 
NGOs that would allow NGOs to respond more quickly to urgent needs in areas where there 
is an international military presence and preclude the need or temptation for militaries to fill 
these roles themselves. 
 
A more positive development has been the donors’ insistence on receiving detailed plans 
from agencies they fund; this encourages aid agencies to plan more strategically, by outlining 
their objectives, outputs, impact, activities and outcomes. This approach encourages the 
organisations receiving funds to manage projects effectively and efficiently and work towards 
a strategic end that benefits the broader stakeholder community and complements, rather than 
duplicates or erodes, the work of other intervening agencies. 
 
Performance management 
An added dimension of many humanitarian operations with “wide variation in the quality of 
field programs and the technical competence of staff” is that beneficiaries and donors often 
have no way to gauge the effectiveness and accountability of humanitarian agencies at the 
field level (Natsios, 1995b, p. 409). The humanitarian community is not known for recording 
details pertaining to their relief operations thereby reducing learning opportunities and 
institutional memory regarding successes and failures. The military for their part record all 
aspects of their mission this transfer of knowledge and information is crucial in building and 
developing efficient and effective logistical relief for the next humanitarian crisis. Research 
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should be conducted in analysing mechanisms to encourage humanitarian agencies to capture 
information pertaining to the success and failure of a relief effort. This research should 
include cross referencing with the military to determine where improvements and greater 
efficiencies can be found. 
 
Human resources 
The issue of selection and recruitment remains the cornerstone for effective logistical 
management in CIMIC. As in business logistics the quality of people is critical in the delivery 
of humanitarian aid, particularly those that have the skill set to operate complex logistical 
systems. The implications for training and the costs of solutions are important in this regard. 
Innovation in problem solving is needed, along with the importance of understanding the 
sources of uncertainty in the humanitarian supply chain. 
 
Calls persist for more cross-fertilisation to take place within military, UN agency and NGO 
training programmes and contingency planning. The skills and approaches used and the 
personalities of the people involved matter to coordination outcomes. As well as strong 
logistical knowledge and skills, recruitment should emphasise skills that include negotiation, 
conflict management, leadership capabilities and/or abilities, as well as interpersonal and 
communication skills, if civil and military personnel are to bridge major organisational 
divides and promote coordination.  
 
Efforts are underway to encourage military and civilian personnel to participate in joint 
workshops and exercises (e.g. Exercise Viking – a European interagency exercise) to study 
subjects of mutual interest, and to learn about each other’s perspectives. There could be merit 
in conducting joint contingency planning, particularly logistical planning. 
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Boundaries 
Humanitarian organisations adhere to the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and humanity. 
A key challenge for the humanitarian community is to clarify for themselves and the military 
how humanitarian principles apply to activities in settings such as humanitarian relief. The 
military do not apply these principles in quite the same way and consequently close 
cooperation between humanitarians and other actors can lead to the perception that the 
humanitarians have become ‘tainted’, reducing their ability to gain access to those in need.  
 
The principle of neutrality and the division of tasks from the military is guarded by agencies 
engaged in humanitarian work. The military have the logistical capacity to deliver aid in 
certain circumstances where humanitarian actors cannot gain access (due to degraded 
infrastructure, security threats) so, should the military not intervene? To ensure clear 
delineation the military should focus its efforts on establishing security and resist the 
temptation to promote its mission in humanitarian or development terms. Military and 
humanitarian organisations need to establish ‘clear blue water’ between one another 
otherwise boundaries become blurred, which results in lives becoming endangered, 
particularly the beneficiaries and aid workers. The solution is likely to involve closer contact 
and joint training exercises before deployment to foster understanding and trust between the 
various organisations. 
 
Culture 
Organisations will not learn effectively until they recognise and confront the implications of 
the three occupational cultures (strategic, operational and tactical) (Schein, 1996). Until 
military and humanitarian personnel discover that they use different languages and make 
different assumptions about what is important and until they learn to treat each other’s culture 
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as valid and normal, organisational cooperative efforts will continue to fail. Some solutions 
include taking the concept of culture more seriously. Instead of superficially manipulating a 
few priorities and calling that "culture change" (Schein, 1996) both the military and 
humanitarian community must recognise and accept how deeply embedded the shared, tacit 
assumptions of military and humanitarian personnel are. Avenues to communicate across the 
cultural boundaries have to be found. This is achievable by establishing some communication 
that stimulates mutual understanding rather than mutual blame. The creation of 
communication by learning how to conduct cross-cultural "dialogues" needs to be 
encouraged. If the military and humanitarian organisations (who come from different 
cultures) sit in a room together, which is hard enough, they must reflectively listen to 
themselves and to each other, which is even harder. 
 
Doctrine 
The end of the Cold War re-oriented military doctrines which included potential contributions 
to disaster relief operations (Heaslip, 2011). Although strictly adhering to doctrine may 
hinder some flexibility in chaotic humanitarian operations, it greatly contributes to 
institutionalization, resulting in less inconsistency, less duplication and smoother rotations in 
both global aid agencies and the military. Doctrine of all large organisations involved in 
humanitarian provision from the UN, UN-CMCoord (Civil-Military Coordination) forms part 
of the process aimed at creating a better capacity.  Doctrinally the acceptance of Army and 
other defence people working among the civilian population and providing health, education, 
infrastructure and engineering aid is demonstrated by the recent doctrinal changes to the 
Australian Defence Forces (ADF) Army Doctrine:  
“The battle for the hearts and minds of domestic and international audiences is a 
decisive element of warfare. Infantry, working among the people, is uniquely placed 
to influence perceptions through respect for the people, adherence to the laws of 
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armed conflict and the sparing use of force (lethal and nonlethal, kinetic and non-
kinetic) with the greatest possible discrimination.” (Operation Series, 2009)  
 
The use of applied force concepts in a tactical counterinsurgency environment, i.e. the COIN 
approach used in Afghanistan is supportive of the humanitarian logistical modelling. Its 
phases are shape, clear, hold and build. The ‘shape’ phase is a strategic planning phase; the 
‘clear’ phase involves the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) troops to clear the 
area of insurgents; the ‘hold’ phase demonstrates the overlap of phases as it incorporates both 
the maintenance of security and ensuring that the area remains clear of any insurgent action 
whilst concurrently assisting with the ‘build’ phase. The ‘build’ phase includes establishing 
the basic services, basic law and order, supporting the indigenous forces of the host nation to 
take over and let the people acknowledge their support for their own resources and military 
and civilian cohorts. In such fragile states the fluidity of the COIN stages are forever 
transitioning. Military staff is becoming adept at adjusting rapidly to the fluidity of COIN 
phases and it is a clear lesson to be learnt by the humanitarian logisticians. The fluidity of 
these COIN phases also make it extremely testing for the international aid agencies working 
in areas of conflict not only in Afghanistan but across Africa and there is often very close 
coordination of the logistical flows and reverse flows as the fluidity of conflict surges and 
ebbs in fragile environments. 
 
Conclusion 
To the layperson, the term civil-military coordination evokes notions of a seamless division 
of labour between aid workers and international military forces. The images of humanitarian 
organizations distributing food and medicines under the protection of military forces, or aid workers 
and military working together to construct refugee camps, set up field hospitals, provide emergency 
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water and sanitation, has become more frequent. The problem is that this image of civil-military 
teamwork is too simplistic and assumes too much.  
 
This prevailing approach frames coordination as a technical exercise that the right 
combination of meetings, information flow, and coordination focal points can solve. It also 
frames civil-military coordination as an agreed goal. Yet in areas of active conflict and in 
fragile post-conflict settings, the mandates, timeframes, guiding principles and methodologies 
for working of civilian aid agencies and military forces are radically different and often clash, 
despite good intentions and a sincere common desire to “help the people” between most 
international military and civilian aid personnel involved in international peace operations. 
Attempting to bridge what are perceived to be cultural and operational disconnects, may very 
well dilute the consolidated product/service that an inter-agency effort delivers.  
 
The challenges to better civil military coordination are numerous but not insurmountable. In 
reality, during major humanitarian operations, strongly motivated people in both camps 
usually find ways to surmount these challenges, but valuable time is lost inventing and 
reinventing these solutions. In recent years relationships have improved, but considerable 
progress is necessary before both sides can realise the advantages of improved cooperation.  
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